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Articles
On Golden Parachutes-Ripcords or
Ripoffs? Some Comments on Special
Termination Agreements
MARTIN RIGER*
I. Introduction
The continuing development of new kinds of rewards for
corporate executives has been an accepted part of the corporate
scene. Basic salary, deferred compensation, and pension plans
have over the years been supplemented by a variety of incentive
programs, including profit-sharing and stock bonus plans, quali-
fied and non-qualified stock options, restricted stock, perform-
ance shares, and phantom stock,' for the most part seeking to
maximize executives' personal income by minimizing their in-
come tax liability.' Prior to the latest manifestation of the crea-
* B.A., 1931, Cornell University; LL.B., 1934, Columbia University School of Law;
Professor of Law Emeritus, Georgetown University Law Center
1. For descriptions and discussions of many of these programs, and their related tax
aspects under the Internal Revenue Code as amended from time to time, see, e.g., Note,
Phantom Stock Plans, 76 HARV. L. REv. 619 (1963); Vernava, Stock Options: Corporate,
Regulatory and Related Tax Aspects, 30 U. PIr. L. REv. 197 (1968); Sherman, Deferred
Compensation-Qualified and Nonqualified: A Legislative Perspective Through the
Tax Reform Act of 1969, 11 WM. & MARY L. REv. 870 (1970); Foote, Performance
Shares, HARV. Bus. REv., Nov.-Dec. 1973, at 121; Herzel and Perlman, Stock Option
Rights, 33 Bus. LAw. 749 (1978); Hubbard, IRS Gives Some Answers on Incentive Stock
Options, Legal Times of Wash., Jan. 11, 1982, at 17.
2. See, e.g., the comment of Peter F. Drucker in THE CHANGING WORLD OF THE Ex-
EctIvE 21-22 (1982):
To shield executives from the rapacity of the tax collector, corporations have
availed themselves of every tax shelter or tax loophole that the law and lawyers
have created. Stock options are just one example. Most executives know that the
explanations given for these gimmicks are pure hokum. I have yet to meet an
executive who really believes that stock options act as an incentive or promote
performance. Everyone knows that they are tax avoidance, pure and simple.
Id.
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tive powers of management and their counsel-the so-called
Special Termination Agreement or "Golden Parachute"-these
programs without exception sought their corporate justification
and legal validity in terms of their benefit to the employer cor-
poration.3 The Special Termination Agreement (STA), a ques-
tionable by-product of the current tender offer phenomenon,
purports to be similarly motivated.
As its name indicates, the STA's focus is on the executive's
potential exit rather than on his retention. In essence, it is the
instrument for providing substantial money and other benefits,
over and above those the executive would otherwise receive on
termination, if the latter is the consequence of a change in con-
trol of the corporation that adversely affects his status or emolu-
ments. The termination may then be at his option or it may be
involuntary. In a number of instances these agreements have
been hastily drawn in the thick of a contested takeover effort.'
Other corporations have adopted them when no threat of take-
over was imminent but there was some cause to fear they might
be next.5 Not surprisingly, the novelty of the STA as an ex-
ecutive "perk" and the amounts involved have attracted
still others,6 even though in biblical parlance, no man pur-
3. For example, the Phillips Petroleum Company's Proxy Statement for its 1982 An-
nual Meeting stated: "The objective of the Company's total compensation program is to
assist the Company in competing to attract, retain, develop, and motivate the full poten-
tial of its human resources." Proxy Statement of the Phillips Petroleum Company 10
(March 29, 1982). The faithful reader of corporate proxy statements has seen the sub-
stance of this recital endlessly repeated in connection with executive compensation de-
scriptions and proposals.
4. See, e.g., Garfinckel Officers Get Hefty Protection in a Hostile Takeover: Move
Was Cleared by Board A Day Before Allied Stores Advanced $48-a-Share Bid, Wall St.
J., August 25, 1981, at 14, col. 3.
The board of Garfinckel, Brooks Brothers, Miller & Rhoads Inc. has agreed to pay
David R. Waters, its chairman, and 11 other officers lump sum payments equalling
three times their annual compensation, if they quit after an unfriendly takeover
.... Garfinckel said it was a concidence that the antitakeover package was ap-
proved just before the Allied offer.
Id. Garfinckel's STA is described more fully infra notes 41-45 and accompanying text.
5. See, e.g., Proxy Statement of the Phillips Petroleum Company at 20: "The devel-
opment of these contracts [STAs] was not undertaken in the belief that a takeover of the
Company was imminent." Id. It was done "[in recognition of widespread merger activity
in 1981. ... Id.
The most publicized example that year involved another oil company, Conoco Inc.,
discussed infra notes 10-12 and accompanying text.
6. See, e.g., Olin Corp. Discloses Contracts for Officers In Event of Takeover, Wall
[Vol. 3:15
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sueth.7 Whatever the immediate motivation, the STA is already
reaching for a place in the executive compensation catalogue.,
The ultimate question raised by the STA is why, in the spe-
cial circumstances of a takeover, merger, or other shift in the
control of the corporation, the order of the executive's going
should be accompanied by special benefits in large amounts that
he would not otherwise receive on termination. Cast in contract
law terms, the question is whether the corporation receives valid
and adequate consideration for these special, and substantial,
additional payments, or whether they are, in fact and in law, no
more than gifts on parting, constituting corporate waste. Some
representative examples adopted in 1981, a year in which STAs
proliferated," provide the background against which this article
will consider the validity of these agreements.
II. Representative STAs
A. Conoco
Conoco Inc., having successfully resisted other suitors, re-
ported in July of that year that it had agreed to merge into a
wholly-owned subsidiary of Du Pont following consummation of
St. J., Apr. 22, 1982, at 3, col. 5: "An Olin spokesman said that the contracts weren't
prompted by any takeover approach or merger offer and that none have been made. 'It's
being done by quite a lot of companies in an atmosphere where there are and have been
takeovers and mergers .... It's almost a fad.'" Id.
7. The reference is to Proverbs 28:1 (King James Version): "The wicked flee though
no man pursueth."
8. As might be expected, the corporate bar is more than an incidental beneficiary of,
and contributor to, the mounting trend to adopt STAs. See Stern, Pulling the Golden
Cord, FoRBEs 31 (May 24, 1982), quoting a leading practitioner in this area: "'I would
say that this year perhaps half of the biggest 500 companies have either this kind of
severance program or options or other benefit programs that would be accelerated in the
event of change of control'. . . . In fact, the law firm has been advising clients with a fill-
in-the-blanks 'senior executive severance plan.'" Id.
9. See "Golden Parachutes" for Ousted, N.Y. Times, Apr. 4, 1982, at 31, col. 5.
Examples in 1982 are not lacking; see, e.g., Marietta is Seeking "3d Parties," N.Y.
Times, Sept. 1, 1982, at D1, col. 8: "The Martin Marietta Corporation, continuing to
resist an unfriendly takeover offer from the Bendix Corporation, disclosed yesterday that
it expects to hold merger talks with unidentified 'third parties' . . . . Martin Marietta
also disclosed that it had given so-called golden parachutes, or employment contracts, to
29 key executives on Monday-five days after it received the takeover bid from Bendix."
Id. As Bendix in turn became the takeover target, it followed suit with parachutes for its
own executives. See infra note 62.
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that company's tender offer for the common stock of Conoco.10
The report related that "employment agreements" had been en-
tered into by Conoco with the chairman and with the president
of that company, and with seven other executives, to become op-
erative if and when there was a "Change in Control" of the com-
pany." By definition in the agreements this would occur if the
company's common stock was no longer listed on the New York
Stock Exchange," or if as much as 20% of that stock would be
acquired by another corporation or person or group of persons
acting in concert."3 The latter event being foreshadowed, if not
in fact already completed by Du Pont, at the time the agree-
ments were executed, these became operative shortly thereafter.
The chief executive's contract provides he may now "terminate
his employment at any time if he shall determine in good faith
that due to the Change in Control he is not able effectively to
10. See Solicitation/Recommendation Statement on Schedule 14D-9 filed with the
Securities and Exchange Commission by Conoco Inc., July 15, 1981, at 3-4 [hereinafter
referred to as Conoco's Schedule 14D-91. The merger transaction was to be used here, as
in other successful tender situations whether or not "hostile," to eliminate the shares
that were not tendered. The tender offeror in such cases, having acquired sufficient
shares via the tender route, is assured of the merger's approval. The terms of the merger
will then force the non-tendering shareholders to accept cash or other securities for their
shares. The procedure is well summarized in Freund and Greene, Substance Over Form
S-14: A Proposal to Reform SEC Regulation of Negotiated Acquisitions, 36 Bus. LAW.
1483, 1499-1505 (1981). Merger with a wholly-owned subsidiary of Du Pont rather than
with Du Pont directly, a so-called "triangular merger," is utilized for various business
reasons, e.g., to shield the parent company from liabilities of the acquired target com-
pany. See FREUND, THE ANATOMY OF A MERGER 78-79 (1975).
11. The agreements are set forth in Exhibits 5 and 6, Amendment No. 1 to Conoco's
Schedule 14D-9, filed July 20, 1981.
12. This could occur if the number of publicly-held shares or the number of share-
holders fell below prescribed numbers, as the result of merger or tender offer, respec-
tively. See N.Y. Stock Exchange Manual, Sec. A 16 (1981); S.E.C. Rule 12d2-2, 17 C.F.R.
§ 240.12d2-2 (1981).
13. The concern here is that holdings of this amount would threaten control. FORBES
reports that the latest fad in corporate acquisitions is the purchase of a number of mi-
nority interests rather than an attempt at total takeover via tender offer: "'This is abso-
lutely going to be the game of the 1980's,'" according to one of the country's top take-
over lawyers. Lawyer's Lament, Arbitrager's Delight, FORBES 31 (May 24, 1982). One
reason is that 20%-size blocks of stock can be acquired in the market, at market prices,
as distinguished from total takeover for which premiums of from 35% to 100% over
market have been paid. At the same time the threat posed by a 20% block may lead the
target company to repurchase it at a premium price. See Nathan and Sobel, Corporate
Stock Repurchases in the Context of Unsolicited Takeover Bids, 35 Bus. LAW. 1545,
1564-1566 (1980).
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discharge his duties."1' The other executives are not given quite
the same freedom of action. They may now voluntarily termi-
nate for "Good Reason;" defined, inter alia, to mean downgrad-
ing of position, reduction in salary, or failure by their new em-
ployer to increase salary annually in accordance with a Conoco
merit increase budget, or failure to maintain participation in
benefit plans, or relocation of the executive.15 Meanwhile, the
contracts having become operative, the executives are guaran-
teed the salary, incentive compensation, and other benefits pro-
vided in the agreements until the dates indicated in the follow-
ing paragraph. 6
The benefits are substantial. Upon voluntary termination
(unless for other than a "Good Reason"), or if the executive's
employment is "arbitrarily" terminated, (but not if terminated
by reason of death, retirement, disability or by the employer for
"Cause"), he will continue thereafter to receive each month one-
twelfth of his-then annual base salary, plus one-twelfth of his
then highest previous annual award under Conoco's incentive
compensation plan.17 This would go on until April 1, 1989 in the
case of the chief executive officer, until October 1, 1985 in the
case of the president, and until July 1, 1984 in the case of the
remaining executives.' 8 All the executives would on termination
14. Amendment No. 1 to Conoco's Schedule 14D-9, Exhibit 5, section 4(d). See
supra note 11.
15. See id. at Exhibit 6, para. 4(d).
16. The Du Pont acquisition may not be so positive for others. See Merger's After-
math: Du Pont, Once a Hero, Has Become a Villain, Many at Conoco Feel, Wall St. J.,
June 16, 1982, at 1, col. 6. Nor have Du Pont's shareholders necessarily benefited from
the acquisition at a cost to Du Pont approximating $7.54 billion. See Ruback, The Co-
noco Takeover and Stockholder Returns, SLOAN MGMT. REV. 13 (Winter 1982).
17. Amendment No. 1 to Conoco's Schedule 14D-9, Exhibit 6, para. 5. In passing,
one is struck by the anomaly of an ex-employee continuing to receive "incentive" com-
pensation. Perhaps no more incentive was required before termination than after. See
supra note 2. Cf. Loomis, The Madness of Executive Compensation, FORTUNE 42, 43
(July 12, 1982): "In the compensation of chief executives, any similarity between rewards
received and performance demonstrated often seems almost coincidental." Id.
18. See Conoco's Schedule 14D-9 at 5. It is specially provided that the chief execu-
tive's amounts could be received by him in a lump sum equal to the present value on
termination of his remaining payments discounted at 9% per annum. Amendment No. 1
to Conoco's Schedule 14D-9, Exhibit 5, section 5(c)(i). His 1981 compensation was ap-
proximately $637,000. This amount per year over eight years discounted at 9% would
approximate $3.5 million. Among his other Conoco benefits assumed by Du Pont were
stock options, exercisable at an average price of $39.70 per share, of which he held op-
19821
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continue to be entitled, until the dates given above for each, to
all benefits and service credits under all employee benefit plans
as if still employed,"' and the exercise period of any stock op-
tions they held would be extended to the same dates;20 in addi-
tion, the employer would be obligated to pay all legal fees and
expenses incurred by the executive should the company contest
the validity or enforceability of the agreement." None of the
provisions of the agreement, as noted above, would become ef-
fective until a Change in Control. Until then the agreement did
not require the employer to retain the executive or to pay him
any specified level of compensation," thus emphasizing the total
preoccupation with preservation of the executive's benefits after
a Change in Control.
B. Sunbeam
Sunbeam Corporation, while resisting a tender offer, re-
ported in October of 1981 that it had some days earlier executed
"termination agreements" with a number of key executives, in-
cluding its chairman, president and 16 other top officers of the
company.23 The benefits provided by the agreements would not
be payable until after a change in control of the company, de-
fined somewhat differently than by Conoco, but with a similar
import. In Sunbeam's case this would occur in the event of a
change in control of a nature required to be reported to the Se-
curities and Exchange Commission,' or if any person or corpo-
ration became the beneficial owner of 25% or more of the voting
power of the company's securities," or if during any period of
two consecutive years the persons constituting a majority of the
tions to purchase some 79,000 shares. In anticipation of the Du Pont merger, Conoco
stock closed on July 8, 1982 at $76 %] per share. See Conoco Protects Nine of Its Top
Officers With Takeover Compensation Agreements, Wall St. J., July 9, 1981, at 4, col. 2.
19. Amendment No. 1 to Conoco's Schedule 14D-9, Exhibit 5, para. 5(c)(ii) and Ex-
hibit 6, para. 5(c)(ii).
20. Id., Exhibit 5, para. 5(c)(iv) and Exhibit 6, para. 5(c)(iv).
21. Id., Exhibit 5, para. 5(c)(vi) and Exhibit 6, para. 5(c)(vi).
22. Conoco's Schedule 14D-9 at 4.
23. Amendment No. 2 to Sunbeam's Schedule 14D-9, filed Oct. 13, 1981, Item 3.
24. Id., Exhibit 6, at section 2. The reference is to Item 5(f) of Schedule 14A of
Regulation 14A under the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, as amended, 17 C.F.R. I
240].14A-5(f) (1981).
25. Amendment No. 2 to Sunbeam's Schedule 14D-9, Exhibit 6, section 2.
[Vol. 3:15
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board ceased to be such, unless the election, or nomination for
election by the stockholders, of each new director was approved
by a vote of at least two-thirds of the directors still in office who
were directors at the beginning of the period.2 6
Assuming a change in control, the Sunbeam executive, as
with Conoco, would receive the STA's special benefits on volun-
tary termination for Good Reason; here to occur if his status and
duties or his base salary are reduced, or existing bonus plans in
which he may now participate, or his present participation
therein, are discontinued, or any benefit or compensation plan,
stock ownership plan, stock purchase plan, stock option plan,
life insurance plan, health or accident plan or disability plan in
which he is participating is discontinued or amended adversely
to him, or he is required to be based more than 50 miles from
his present office, or the number of paid vacation days to which
he is presently entitled is reduced. 7 As if these did not suffice,
the STA benefits would also be payable if, following a change in
control, the executive is terminated without "adequate identifi-
cation" of a reason that would deny him these benefits, such as
disability or cause,28 or if the successor in control fails to agree
to perform the agreement.2"
Upon termination entitling him to the STA benefits, the
Sunbeam executive would receive, in addition to his full base
salary to the date of termination, plus credit for vacation earned
but not taken, plus the amount of any bonus not yet awarded or
paid under the company's bonus plan, an STA lump sum equal
to the amount of his annual base salary at its highest rate in the
preceding 12 months multiplied by one if his age is less than
26. Such a change could be the consequence of a successful tender offer or of a
merger. In addition, it could be the result of a proxy contest, as to which "many Wall
Street analysts expect a new wave of proxy fights, in which dissident investors, rather
than trying to buy a company outright, will seek to wrest the reins from management by
winning shareholder support for a new corporate strategy." Lewin, Waging Corporate
War by Proxy, N.Y. Times, July 4, 1982, at Fl, col. 5.
27. Amendment No. 2 to Sunbeam's Schedule 14D-9, Exhibit 6, section 3(iii). Anal-
ogous provisions are set forth in Conoco's STA, Amendment No. 1 to Schedule 14D-9,
Exhibit 6, section 4(d). It is instructive to observe top corporate executives, with six-
figure salaries, as much concerned with the number of their paid vacation days as a labor
union negotiating a contract for blue-collar workers.
28. Amendment No. 2 to Sunbeam's Schedule 14D-9, Exhibit 6, section 3(iii)(G).
29. Id. section 3(iii)(F).
1982]
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fifty, or multiplied by one and one-half if he is fifty or over but
less than fifty-five, or multiplied by two if he is 55 or over, plus
all legal fees and expenses as a result of the termination, includ-
ing those incurred in enforcing his rights under the agreement.30
In addition, for two years thereafter, or until new full time em-
ployment elsewhere, all life insurance, medical, health and acci-
dent, and disability plans in which he had been entitled to par-
ticipate, or the equivalent, would be continued for his benefit."s
Two months after these agreements were executed, Sunbeam
agreed to merge with a wholly-owned subsidiary of Allegheny In-
ternational Inc.32
C. Brunswick
The pattern is repeated with Brunswick Corporation which,
late in 1981, entered into "employment agreements" with a
number of its top executives.33 Some slight substantive differ-
ences from Sunbeam's agreement appear but the latter is closely
tracked. Thus, a change of control would follow a change of a
nature required to be reported to the Securities and Exchange
Commission, or the acquisition of 25% or more voting power of
Brunswick's outstanding securities by another person or corpo-
ration.3 For Brunswick, a change in the composition of the
30. Id. section 4(i)-(iii).
31. Id. section 4(iv).
32. For subsequent post-honeymoon developments, comparable to Conoco's, supra
note 16, see Employees at Acquired Firms Find White Knights Often Unfriendly, Wall
St. J., July 7, 1982, at 23, col. 4, describing the extensive bloodletting, including the
departure of some executives with STAs, that followed Allegheny's takeover.
For a definition of "white knight", see Ehrbar, Corporate Takeovers Are Here To
Stay, FORTUNE 91, 93 May 8, 1978: "[I]nvestment bankers have become remarkably
adept at drumming up second bidders-known in the argot of the game as 'knights.' A
'white knight' is one that the target finds particularly attractive." Id.
33. See Brunswick's Schedule 14D-9, filed Feb. 16, 1982, Exhibit 2, at 18-19. In ad-
dition, existing contracts with its chairman and president were revised to add to them
the STA benefits contained in the agreements with the other executives. Id. at 18.
34. Id., Exhibit 8, at 1-2. See supra text accompanying notes 24-25. Resisting a
tender offer by Whittaker Corporation, Brunswick recommended acceptance by its
shareholders of a competing tender offer by American Home Products Corporation
(AHP). Id. Exhibit 2, at 1. The latter sought the shares, not to acquire Brunswick in toto
as did Whittaker, but for the purpose of exchanging them, pursuant to an agreement
with Brunswick, for the stock of the latter's subsidiaries constituting its medical busi-
ness. Id. at 2. On the completion of its offer, which was successful, AHP owned more
than 25% of the voting power of Brunswick's securities, but the Compensation Commit-
[Vol. 3:15
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board of directors would also constitute a change in control, con-
fined, however, to a change in the majority of the board as the
consequence of a shareholders' meeting involving a contest for
the election of directors.5 8 Like Conoco, the Brunswick agree-
ment would establish a five-year period beginning with the date
of change in control, unless the executive sooner reached his
65th birthday, during which his authority and duties would be
"commensurate" with those immediately prior to the change in
control, his salary could not be less than before, his eligibility for
bonus, stock option, restricted stock, and other incentive com-
pensation plans would be continued, and he would be entitled to
receive such other benefits as medical, insurance, and split-dol-
lar life insurance." If, after a change in control, the benefits and
perquisites available to executives with comparable duties are
greater than those to which he was entitled before the change in
control, he would be entitled to the greater.2 A significant
change in the nature or scope of his authority or duties, or a
reduction in his salary or other benefits, or his own "reasonable
determination" that the change in control and resultant changes
significantly affecting his position left him unable to perform his
duties as before, would permit the executive to resign and re-
ceive his special severance benefits." These, called "termination
payments," would consist of his continuing receipt of his salary
for the balance of the five years from the date of the change in
control, plus the estimated amount of any bonuses to which he
would have been entitled had he remained in employment for
the balance of the period.8 9 In addition, he would be deemed an
tee of the Brunswick Board of Directors determined with respect to its STAs, "that the
AHP Offer and the exchange of Shares acquired pursuant to the AHP Offer for the
Medical Stock will not constitute a 'change of control of Brunswick' for purposes of such
agreements." Id. at 19.
Brunswick's sale of its medical business, in response to a hostile tender offer, is an
example of the use of asset redeployment as a defensive tactic. The present legal posture
of this and other current takeover defenses is discussed in Fleischer and Raymond,
Whittaker-Brunswick Bid: Study in Takeover Defense, Legal Times of Wash., June 28,
1982, at 18; July 5, 1982, at 14 [hereinafter referred to as Fleischer and Raymond].
35. Brunswick Schedule 14D-9, Exhibit 8, section 2.
36. Id. at section 4.
37. Id.
38. Id. at section 5.
39. Id. at section 6(a). Complex alternative provisions permit the executive to elect
a "lump sum severance allowance" in lieu of his "termination payments." Id. at section
19821
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employee for the balance of the period for the purpose of inclu-
sion in all other benefit plans, including all stock option or other
incentive compensation plans, and medical, insurance, and like
plans.4
D. Garfinchel
One further example, a bit off the beaten track, will suffice
for the purpose of displaying representative STA examples. Gar-
finckel, Brooks Brothers, Miller & Rhoads, Inc. (Garfinckel), in
August of 1981, agreed to merge into a wholly-owned subsidiary
of Allied Stores Corporation (Allied), following a tender offer by
Allied for the common stock of Garfinckel. 41 Earlier in the same
year Garfinckel's Form 10-K for the year ending January 31,
1981 disclosed that there were then in effect employment con-
tracts with its two top executives, who were also directors, run-
ning until 1987, and with other important executives none of
whose contracts expired before 1983. A standard clause in all of
the contracts provided that in the event of a merger with or into
any other corporation, or if substantially all of the assets of Gar-
finckel were transferred to another corporation, or a change of
control of Garfinckel was effected by any person, firm or corpo-
ration without approval or assent of its board, the option to ter-
minate the contract could be exercised by the executive. No spe-
cial monetary or other benefits attached to the exercise of this
right.42
In a report filed with the Securities and Exchange Commis-
sion by Garfinckel on August 17, 1981, while Allied's initial $48 a
share offer was pending and contested, it was disclosed that four
days earlier the existing employment contracts had been
amended with board approval to provide STA benefits.' These
included, among other things, a lump-sum cash payment equal
9.
40. Id. at section 6(b).
41. See Garfinckel, Brooks Bros., Miller & Rhoads, Inc. Amendment No. 2 to Sched-
ule 14D-9, filed Sept. 3, 1981, at 3.
42. The Form 10-K was filed May 1, 1981. The information regarding the employ-
ment contracts is contained in the Company's Proxy Statement dated April 24, 1981, at
14-16, filed as Exhibit I to the 10-K. The clause regarding the executive's termination
right is found in Exhibit 10 to the 10-K, at 6-7.
43. See Garfinckel's Schedule 14D-9, filed August 17, 1981, at 4-5.
[Vol. 3:15
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to three times the highest annual compensation (including in-
centive compensation as well as base salary) paid or payable to
the executive for any of the three years ending with the date of
his voluntary termination of employment, if such termination
occurred within two years of a change in control not approved
by the incumbent board of directors prior to such change."
There was no requirement of a "Good Reason" as a condition to
the exercise of the right. It could be for any reason, other than
death, disability, or retirement under the company's pension
plan, following a "change in control", defined as acquisition of a
majority of Garfinckel's common stock by Allied, or the change
in a majority of the former's board.45 By August 31 Allied had
raised its offer to $53 per share, and on that date the merger
agreement was executed. Because the incumbent board, in exe-
cuting that agreement, had approved the change in control, the
STA provisions presumably remained inoperative.
III. Contract or Gift
"Rewards to executives and employees should be based on ser-
vices performed for the company rather than on other considera-
tions. Elementary as this proposition may seem, it is sometimes
44. Id., Exhibit 2(b), at 1. The focus here on an unfriendly takeover, in apparent
response to the immediate crisis, limits the STA in a way not present in STAs like Co-
noco's which, concerned also with the preservation of position, see infra note 45, look
beyond a friendly takeover to guard against falling out of favor with the "white knight",
an eventuality not unknown in executive circles. See supra notes 16 and 32.
45. Id. at 2. The Garfinckel STA should be distinguished from the type of STA
represented by Conoco, Sunbeam and Brunswick. Those required both a change in con-
trol and a subsequent adverse impact on status or benefits to trigger access to their pay-
out, thus reflecting dual motives: an effort at entrenching the executive's position despite
a change in control, and the receipt of special benefits if the effort did not succeed.
An example of the unqualified "ripcord" in operation can been seen in the STA
given to nine principal executives of Mohasco Corporation. See Form 10-K for the fiscal
year ended December 31, 1980, filed with the Securities and Exchange Commission
March 31, 1981, at Exhibit 6. Here the STA benefits were available upon the executive's
election to leave at any time within six months following a change in control, with no
requirement of "Good Reason," "inability effectively to discharge his duties" or other
similar limiting condition. Id. at section 1. Within six months after another corporation
had increased its purchases of the company's stock to an amount in excess of 19% of the
shares outstanding (constituting a "change in control" as defined in its STA), four of the
executives left "for greener hills." See No Mohasco Takeover, But 4 Bail Out Anyway,
N.Y. Times, May 4, 1982, at D2.
1982]
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overlooked. "4e
Any method of corporate compensation is subject to com-
mon law requirements of legal consideration, fairness, and
fiduciary responsibility on the part of the board that votes it.
The elements constituting corporate waste-a breach of direc-
tor's duty of loyalty, and lack of legal consideration, a common
law requirement-overlap in this situation.47 The Supreme
Court almost fifty years ago, in a case concerned with a corpo-
rate bonus plan, sanctioned the general principle applicable to
corporate compensation: "If a bonus payment has no relation to
the value of the services for which it is given, it is in reality a
gift in part. . .. ,"" In that case the bonus plan was part of the
executives' agreed and anticipated compensation. The bonus
amounts were nonetheless required to relate to the value of the
executives' services.4 e
Absent prior agreement or reasonable expectation by the ex-
ecutive that a bonus may be granted, a bonus given for past ser-
vices lacks legal consideration." None of the STAs examined in
this article seek to sustain their validity on the basis of the rea-
sonable expectations of the executives who are parties to them.
In any event this argument is negated by the obvious fact, and
46. WASHINGTON & ROTHSCHILD, COMPENSATING THE CORPORATE EXECUTIVE 232 (2d
ed. 1962) [hereinafter cited as ROTHSCHILD].
47. Cf. FOLK, THE DELAWARE GENERAL CORPORATION LAW 130 (1972), regarding
stock options as executive compensation:
[T]he term 'consideration' indicates judicial concern . . . with the questions
whether the options will likely guarantee the continued employment of the option-
ees or whether the corporation has 'wasted' its assets by giving out stock options
with inadequate considerations. In this usage, the term may carry connotations of
directors' fulfilling or breaching their fiduciary duty.
Id. See Michelson v. Duncan, 407 A.2d 211, 217 (Del. 1979):
[A]verments that the options were granted for 'no consideration' is tantamount to
an allegation of gift or waste of assets. The essence of a claim of gift is lack of
consideration. The essence of a claim of waste of corporate assets is the diversion
of corporate assets for improper or unnecessary purposes.
Id.
48. Rogers v. Hill, 289 U.S. 582, 591 (1933) (quoting Rogers v. Hill, 60 F.2d 109, 113
(S.D.N.Y. 1932) (Swan, J., dissenting)).
49. Rogers v. Hill, 60 F.2d at 110.
50. See ROTHSCHILD, supra note 46, at 244 n.186: "As to bonuses and similar retro-
active increases of salary except where there has been an expressed or implied under-
standing that they may be granted if conditions warrant, there is no consideration for
them." Id.
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indeed even by the admission," that the STAs are occasioned by
the tender offer phenomenon. Their validity, considered first in
terms of legal consideration, must therefore be analyzed in the
context of new contracts, or amendatory agreements where the
STA supplements an existing contract.
A. Delaware Case Law
An excellent guide to analysis, with all-fours precedent lack-
ing, is available in the Delaware courts' opinions regarding the
grant of stock options to corporate executives.52 Under the Dela-
ware cases a corporation's stated desire to retain the services of
valuable executives-an asserted justification of STAs-does not
of itself suffice to validate the grant of stock options. 2 The
courts require a quid pro quo from the recipient of the options.
This need not be measurable quantitatively in a dollar sense."
But there must be "a reasonable relationship between the value
of the benefits passing to the corporation and the value of the
options granted."5' Moreover, the courts will inquire into
whether there is reasonable assurance that the contemplated
consideration will in fact pass to the corporation."
51. See, e.g., Proxy Statement of the Phillips Petroleum Company 20 (March 29,
1982) to the effect that its STAs were entered into "[in recognition of widespread
merger activity in 1981 .... " Id.
52. For comment overlooking the Delaware stock option cases and decrying the lack
of such precedent, see Masters, Execs' "Golden Parachutes" Await First Court Chal-
lenges, Legal Times of Wash., Nov. 2, 1981, at 1, col. 1 [hereinafter referred to as Mas-
ters]. The stock option cases have particular relevance because out of six derivative ac-
tions known to the author to have been filed attacking STAs as corporate waste, five
were instituted in the Delaware Chancery Court, viz., Lewis v. Anderson (Conoco Inc.),
No. 6505 (Del. Ch. filed July 17, 1982), Sumers v. Bitzer (Sunbeam Corp.), No. 6589 (Del.
Ch. filed Aug. 18, 1982), Kurs v. Abernathy (Brunswick Corp.), No. 6703 (Del. Ch. filed
Feb. 10, 1982), Horvath v. Abernathy (Brunswick Corp.), No. 6729 (Del. Ch. filed March
9, 1982), and Hubner v. Brunswick, No. 6708 (Del. Ch. filed Feb. 16, 1982). A sixth ac-
tion, Lowe v. Brunswick, is pending in the U.S. District Court for the Northern District
of Illinois. In each case the company is a Delaware corporation.
53. Kerbs v. California Eastern Airways, Inc., 33 Del. Ch. 69, 90 A.2d 652 (Del.
1952); Frankel v. Donovan, Del. Ch. 69, 120 A.2d 311 (1956). See generally 57 ALR 3d
1241 (1974 & Supp. 1982).
54. Beard v. Elster, 39 Del. Ch. 153, 160 A.2d 731 (Del. 1960).
55. Olson Bros., Inc. v. Englehart, 245 A.2d 166, 168 (Del. 1968); Kerbs v. California
Eastern Airways, Inc., 33 Del. Ch. at 78, 120 A.2d at 657-68.
56. See, e.g., Kerbs v. California Eastern Airways, Inc., 33 Del. Ch. at 77, 120 A.2d
at 656.
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B. Retention Thesis
The value of the benefits granted to the executive by the
STA is measurable without difficulty. The search for something
of substance reasonably related to the value of the benefits and
passing to the corporation, however, is the problem. Conoco's ex-
planation, in its schedule 14D-9 filed with the Securities and Ex-
change Commission, was that the agreements "are designed to
encourage the executives to remain in the employ of the Com-
pany by providing them with greater security. '8 7 Barely three
weeks after the board meeting at which STAs were authorized
for nine officers of Conoco, and at which time offers from two
other corporations were not accepted, the Du Pont merger was
announced. At no time was it suggested that the officers contem-
plated leaving; 8 to the contrary, in the nature of things it would
be the principal executives of Conoco, recipients of STAs, who
would be instrumental in the search for a "white knight" to fend
off the undesired suitors. Nor was the "greater security" sought
to be conferred by the STAB otherwise related to a benefit for
Conoco. Indeed, it does not necessarily redound to Du Pont's
benefit after the change in control. It is basic to the STA that its
ultimate objective is keyed to the executive's termination, an act
hardly consistent with his retention. As for the executive, his
"greater security" lies now in Du Pont's obligation, if the STA is
binding on it as the successor to Conoco's obligations," to main-
tain his status and pay for the designated period, or pay him the
additional STA benefits if it does not. The STA's validity is,
57. Conoco's Schedule 14D-9 at 4.
58. In Conoco and the other examples discussed, many of the recipients of STAs
were directors and officers, with presumed fiduciary obligations to the corporation and
its shareholders. There could not be a more unacceptable reason for an STA than such a
recipient's threat to jump ship in the face of a takeover bid unless promised the "greater
security" of an STA. See the recent criticism by courts in this connection cited in
Fleischer and Raymond, supra note 34, at 29 n.56 (June 28, 1982).
59. If the STA lacked consideration from the executive, and hence was unenforce-
able, it would not be binding on Conoco's successor by virtue of the latter's obligation, as
successor by statutory merger, to assume Conoco's liabilities. This defense may be un-
available to the successor if, as a condition of Conoco's agreement to the merger, the
successor expressly assumed the STA, unless the courts should on other grounds, such as
lack of corporate purpose, find the STA vulnerable. The Conoco STA contains a provi-
sion imposing on Conoco the obligation to require any successor by merger to assume it.
Amendment No. 1 to Conoco's 14D-9, Exhibit 5, section 6 and Exhibit 6, section 6. Pre-
sumably the Du Pont subsidiary has done so.
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however, to be judged in the first instance in relation to the par-
ties that execute it, not their successors. As noted earlier, until a
change in control the promise of greater security brought noth-
ing from the executive in return.
Brunswick enlarges on the retention theme: "[T]he Com-
pany wishes to attract and retain well-qualified executive and
key personnel and to assure both itself and the Executive of con-
tinuity of management in the event of any actual or threatened
change in control of the Company."6 The reference to "attract"
in the first half of the sentence seems wholly irrelevant to STAs;
no aspect of hiring plays any part in their origins. The "retain"
reference was discussed in the preceding paragraphs dealing
with Conoco's explanation for its STAs. One need only repeat, as
emphasized by the Delaware opinions, that the desire to retain
executives does not by itself constitute consideration. 1 The bal-
ance of the Brunswick sentence is no more persuasive. There is
something strange about an effort by the company to assure con-
tinuity of management in the event of a change in control of the
company. The sentence becomes more understandable if read as
voicing the present management's desire to continue in office af-
ter a change of control. This, of course, may not accord with the
wishes of those in control after the change. The STA, if valid,
gives them an option of terminating the executives and paying
them the special termination benefits. The objective is thus not
the assurance of continuity of management; it is the assurance of
special termination benefits. In any event, the company will ac-
complish neither, if the STA lacks consideration or is otherwise
vulnerable ab initio. In the latter connection it is questionable
that corporate norms permit a predecessor board, faced with a
takeover, to contract with its executives to limit the discretion of
a successor in control by requiring the successor to pay a special
price to be rid of the executives."
60. Brunswick Schedule 14D-9, Employment agreement, Exhibit 8.
61. See supra notes 52-56 and accompanying text.
62. It is one thing for a "white knight" to assume the STAs in the course of merger,
as in Conoco. Paying billions in that case, the knight would deem the STAs a minor
component of the takeover cost. It is quite another thing for a new group that acquired
control by market purchases, or for a dissident stockholder group that won a proxy con-
test, to find its freedom of decision to install a new board and to make management
changes, exercisable only at an exorbitant price, namely, the payment of special termina-
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C. Distraction Thesis
Sunbeam's concern, according to the preamble to its STA, is
that a threat of a change in control "may result in departure or
distraction of management personnel" to the Company's detri-
ment.63 As for "distraction," the promise of STA benefits would,
according to the preamble," "reinforce and encourage the con-
tinued attention and dedication of members of the Company's
management. . . to their assigned duties. .... ,"5 A variation of
this explanation sees the STA as ensuring that corporate officers
will be able to evaluate a possible takeover threat "cooly, with-
tion benefits by the same corporation.
As a further, and perhaps conclusive, point, the "retention" argument in support of
the STA loses plausibility in the light of current economic conditions. Companies are
cutting jobs at the upper levels, not adding to them. See Main, Hard Times Catch Up
With Executives, FORTUNE 50 (Sept. 20, 1982). The desire for "retention" in these cases
is the executives,' out of concern for their income and position. See Bendix Provides
Salary Guarantee for 16 Officers, Wall St. J., Sept. 10, 1982, at 2, col. 2:
Bendix Corp., under pressure from takeover threats by United Technologies Corp.
and Martin Marietta Corp., unfurled expensive "golden parachute" employment-
contract guarantees for 16 officers to protect them in case control of the company
changes. . . Bendix said the pacts would help assure that the officers would stay
with the company during the current takeover threat and act "in the best interests
of the corporation and its stockholders with respect to (the takeover offers) with-
out concern about income security."
Bendix said the new pacts provide that the executives will be assured of their
current base salary and incentive compensation payments for three years from the
date of any change in control. In [the chairman's] case, the guarantee is for five
years. The new pacts also provide for the company to purchase outright the execu-
tives' stock options after any change in control. Some 867,650 shares are under
option.
[The chairman's] most recent annual salary and bonus amounted to $805,000;
[the president's], $435,000; [the executive vice president's], $435,000... . For all
16 executives, the annual total is $4.7 million, giving the package an indicated
total cost of $15.7 million.
Id. (emphasis added).
As recently stated in the New York Times:
In one sense, he [the chairman] cannot lose the current battle; if the Martin Mari-
etta-United Technologies bid of $75 a share for Bendix succeeds, the sale of [the
chairman's] 52,460 shares of stock plus the option he has to acquire 42,000 more
shares at under $53 a share, will make him a millionaire many times over.
Holusha, Bendix Chief Playing for High Stakes, N.Y. Times, Sept. 10, 1982, at D1, col.
1. So much for "income security."
63. Amendment No. 2 to Sunbeam's Schedule 14D-9, Exhibit 6 at Preamble. See
supra notes 53-62 and accompanying text for a discussion of the retention thesis.
64. Id.
65. Id.
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out fear for their own safety.""M It is novel doctrine that corpo-
rate executives need to be insulated in their decision-making
from the fear that a takeover will redound to their detriment, by
promising them more money if that happens. The argument in
effect is that the law should recognize as valid consideration for
the promise of more money, the doing of that for which execu-
tives are already being paid, i.e., their continued attention and
dedication to their assigned duties.
D. As Conditional Payments
Some seek a basis for validity in the fact that STA pay-
ments are conditional; just how has not been explained. The
thought may be that a gift looks less like a gift if its delivery is
delayed. Normally, if payments to executives are made condi-
tional, the conditions will involve a discernible benefit to the
corporation; for example, post-retirement payments may be con-
ditioned on the executive providing consulting services, or on his
not working for competitors. STAs predicate payments on the
occurrence of a change in control-an event unrelated to the ex-
cutive's duties of care and loyalty as an employee. Changes in
the composition of the board, or the emergence of new control-
ling interests, are external to the job for which the executive was
hired. Should these occasion his departure, no reason yet ap-
pears for his receiving benefits substantially in excess of what he
would otherwise receive on termination if there had been no
change of control.
E. Established Expectations Thesis
Another approach to the conditional aspect of the STA
would seek to subsume it under the rubric "conditional cash bo-
nus". The roadblock here is that the concept requires such bo-
nus to be reasonably anticipated on the basis of an express or
implied agreement that it may be granted." The Garfinckel STA
is as clear a case lacking this saving feature as may be found. As
noted, none of the existing employment contracts had terms ex-
66. Masters, supra note 52, at 10, col. 2.
67. See id.
68. Supra note 50.
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piring before 1983.69 The contracts expressly afforded the execu-
tives the right to terminate in the event of a change in control.
By conveying no special benefits in this connection, the provi-
sions themselves negate an expectation that they would be paid.
The Garfinckel board resolution proceeded to graft substantial
additional dollars to the provision on the eve of the Allied
merger. These lump-sum amounts, equivalent to three years'
pay, would be paid in the event of a change in control "to the
Executive as compensation for services rendered to the Corpora-
tion. '70 Reliance on past services as consideration is, in this case,
an admission of no consideration.
A sophisticated effort at utilizing a "reasonable expecta-
tions" argument, but not in its accepted context as described
above, has been proposed by counsel apparently connected with
STA preparation.7 ' This argument posits the premise that a
tender offer may result in "an important upset to established
expectations of top executives."' The alleged established expec-
tations are that they would have security of tenure if they are
performing reasonably well, "[o]r, at the least, they might expect
security from risks that are not anticipated and therefore have
not been adjusted for in choice of job or in compensation";7 8 on
these premises "it is easy to see [sic] why an adjustment in com-
pensation, even at the last moment, may be considered fair by a
sympathetic board of directors. 74 The premises assumed in or-
der to reach this conclusion carry their own refutation. No exec-
utive has a vested interest in his position, or a "reasonable" ex-
pectation of shelter from unanticipated risks. From the point of
view of the corporation's and its shareholders' interests, execu-
69. Supra note 42.
70. See supra text accompanying note 42.
71. See Herzel, Golden Parachute Contracts: Analysis, Nat'l L.J., Feb. 15, 1982, at
20, col. 1 [hereinafter referred to as Herzel]. The author is a partner of a Chicago law
firm, which is counsel to Brunswick Corporation; he appears to be personally involved
with Brunswick matters. See Brunswick Schedule 14D-9, cover page. In Brunswick's
Form 10-K Annual Report filed with the Securities and Exchange Commission on March
31, 1982, at 11, the firm states its opinion that the law suits, supra note 52, questioning
the validity of Brunwick's STAs "are without merit." No disclosure is made in the
Herzel article of the firm's interest in supporting the validity of STAs.
72. Herzel, supra note 71, at 22.
73. Id.
74. Id. at 22-23 (emphasis added).
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tives are no more entitled to the expectation, or assurance, that
their tenure is secure than is any other employee. If adversely
affected by a change in control, the executive has experienced a
normal risk of corporate life.
The "established expectations" thesis is also sought to be
buttressed by an injection of market analysis. This argument
poses that employment markets for executives do not adjust to
the risk caused to executives by tender offers, and that the STA
is therefore a remedy for this "economic inefficiency." '75 It being
impossible to isolate quantitatively the discrete elements that
make up an executive's compensation, rationalization of this
sort, with its unproven assumptions, should have no more
credence as an exercise in economics than it has in law.
The analysis to this point, of necessity, has touched on both
contract and corporate law aspects. The former implicates cor-
porate issues; similarly, palpable corporate waste is the corollary
of a lack of any meaningful benefit to the corporation, whatever
the pretense of technical consideration.7 6 The STA, seen clearly,
is then no more than a self-serving effort by executives, with de
facto control over position and pay, to preserve these in the face
of a takeover, with special benefits for themselves at corporate
expense if the effort fails. The effort deserves no legal sanction,
and the benefits are properly characterized as gifts.
IV.
"You have to avoid making it look like a gift""'
A. Conoco
You do it by making the gift look like a normal employment
contract. The Conoco STA, for example, is called, and has a for-
mat consistent with, an "Employment Agreement. 7' It purports
75. Id. at 23.
76. An overlay of purported consideration may be attempted by making the STA
effective for a term of years upon its execution and providing that the executive is em-
ployed for that period. See the Phillips Petroleum Company's Severance Compensation
Contract, Form 10-K for the fiscal year ended December 31, 1981, filed March 30, 1982,
Exhibit 10(a). That agreement remains otherwise entirely confined to STA provisions.
77. The statement is attributed to Herzel (supra note 71). See Masters, supra note
47, at 10.
78. See supra notes 11-22 and accompanying text.
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to employ the executive for a period beginning with the date of
the agreement and expiring in 1984, 1985 or 1989 depending on
the executive. The customary boilerplate as to non-assignability,
notices and the like, and even a post-termination non-competi-
tion clause, are included.7 9 The semblance of a standard employ-
ment contract then fades in the face of the provision that "[this
Agreement shall be effective immediately upon its execution,
but, anything in this Agreement to the contrary notwithstand-
ing, neither this Agreement nor any of its provisions shall be op-
erative unless and until there has been a Change in Control of
the Company." 80 How distant, in fact, it is from the ordinary
agreement is disclosed in Conoco's report to the Securities and
Exchange Commission: "Absent one of such events [the two cri-
teria making for a Change in Control], the agreements do not
require the Company to retain the executive or to pay him any
specified level of compensation."'I Nor, if he were terminated,
for any reason, prior to the change in control, would he receive
the special benefits of the STA.'2 It is apparent the latter is not
an employment contract in any true sense. It is rather an insur-
ance policy, payable on a change of control if thereafter the ex-
ecutive suffers a reduction in status or benefits or is relocated.
The trouble is that no premium was paid for the policy.8'
B. Sunbeam
Sunbeam is slightly more candid in labeling its STAs as
79. Cf. Herzel, supra note 71, at 22: "Like ordinary executive employment agree-
ments, which they resemble in many respects, these agreements require attention to de-
tails." Id.
80. Amendment No. 1 to Conoco's Schedule 14D-9, Exhibit 5, section 1, and Exhibit
6, section 1.
81. Conoco's Schedule 14D-9 at 4.
82. See supra text accompanying note 80.
83. To keep the insurance in force, so to speak, the agreement requires Conoco to
obtain, from any successor to its business or assets, as by merger or purchase an assump-
tion and agreement to perform its provisions. See supra note 59. Since this would not
cover a change in control due solely to another corporation or group acquiring 20% or
more of the company's voting power, the validity of the agreement might then be con-
tested. Presumably to cover this contingency, among others, it is provided that in such
event the company will pay the executive's legal fees and expenses. It is hard to see how
he could collect if the agreement should be held invalid. The question may, in Conoco's
case, be academic. See supra note 16 and accompanying text.
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"termination agreement[s], ' 84 and describes the payments, as
"severance benefits. '85 The agreement has a two-year term, op-
erative, unlike Conoco's, from the date of its execution. But its
benefits are inoperative unless there is a change in control dur-
ing that period. And during that period the executive's employ-
ment could be terminated at any time. A full panoply of employ-
ment contract provisions is also included. The wording of both
the agreement and Sunbeam's report to the Securities and Ex-
change Commission indicate it had the benefit of Conoco's
filings, and despite minimal differences, the end product does
not differ in substance. It merely holds out the prospects of STA
benefits for a shorter period.
C. Brunswick
Brunswick reverts to the Conoco approach in stating a term
of employment beginning on the effective date of the agreement,
defined again as the date on which a change of control occurs.' 6
Like Conoco, the Brunswick agreement does not deal with the
period prior to that date. Executives could be terminated at the
will of the Company prior to a change in control, except for the
two principal executives who hold employment contracts. There-
after the agreement sets up a five year term of employment with
the salary and other emoluments, and the termination provi-
sions, earlier described.87 With careful attention to detail, the
facade of an ordinary executive employment contract is
preserved.
D. Business Judgment Rule
Counsel burdened with the need to sustain the STAs as
contracts can be expected to retreat to the usual fall-back posi-
tion in defending corporate action, namely the business judg-
ment rule. 8 That the rule will be relied on in cases now pending
84. Amendment No. 2 to Sunbeam's Schedule 14D-9, Item 3.
85. Exhibit 6, Preamble.
86. Brunwick's Schedule 14D-9 at 1.
87. See supra notes 33-40 and accompanying text.
88. For a recent statement of the rule in a tender offer (but not "golden parachute")
context, see Panter v. Marshall Field & Co., 646 F.2d 271, 293 (7th Cir.), cert. denied,
454 U.S. 1092 (1981). See also Arsht, The Business Judgment Revisited, 8 HOFsTRA L.
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has been signalled by the author of the "established expecta-
tions" thesis as follows: "[Ilt appears likely the courts would
(and should) follow the usual business judgment rule with re-
gard to golden parachute contracts. '" 9 For what reason? "[S]ince
there are proper motives for these contracts, courts are unlikely
to substitute their own judgments for those of directors except
in situations involving particularly inept [sic] or outrageous con-
duct."90 This last exception seems particularly applicable in the
present context, in the process negating proper motives. In any
case, the latter do not equate with legal consideration or proper
corporate expenditure. The validity of these agreements as con-
tracts is a question of law, as to which the courts must indeed
substitute their own judgment for that of the board. Still an-
other change is rung by its author on the "established expecta-
tions" theme: because in his view upsetting these could lead a
sympathetic board to think it fair to make an upwards adjust-
ment in compensation, even at the last moment,9' "it appears
improbable that a court would conclude that this decision is so
unlikely to benefit the corporation as to put the decision outside
the protection of the business judgment rule." '" The notion thus
advanced is that the courts must accept a sympathetic board's
determination that there is benefit to the corporation, in calm-
ing upset executives with the promise of more money, without
regard to the adequacy of legal consideration or corporate waste.
This would push the business judgment rule to the point of re-
REv. 93 (1979); Symposium, Officers' and Directors' Responsibilities and Liabilities, 27
Bus. LAW. 1 (Special Issue 1972). See also Fleisher and Raymond, supra note 34, at 18,
25-27 (June 28, 1982).
89. See Herzel, supra note 71, at 23.
90. Id. The exceptions to the business judgment rule are somewhat broader than
indicated above. "Fraud, bad faith, gross overreaching and abuse of discretion" should
be added. See Panter v. Marshall Field & Co., 646 F.2d at 293.
91. See supra text accompanying note 74. "However, a last moment adjustment
could present a difficult case for a court unless handled very carefully by the board."
Herzel, supra note 71, at 23. The haste that has marked the "last moment" adoption of
many STAs brings to mind Bennett v. Propp, 41 Del. Ch. 14, 187 A.2d 405 (Del. 1962), in
which the court found corporate waste in a chief executive officer's frantic market
purchases of his company's shares, utilizing its credit for the purpose, to thwart a fancied
threat to his control. The resemblance to executives' hasty entrance into STAs, which
utilize corporate assets, to entrench themselves against a change in control is indeed
close.
92. Herzel, supra note 71, at 23.
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quiring total judicial abdication in the matter of executive
compensation.
The Delaware courts, on the basis of their own decisions,
should not agree. The Delaware Supreme Court's recent opinion
in Michelson v. Duncan,9 is pertinent in several vital respects.
There the plaintiff shareholder had alleged stock options had
been granted for "no consideration." The Vice Chancellor below
had concluded that the plaintiff had failed to allege a claim of
gift or waste of corporate assets." Said the court: "While the
Complaint does not use the words 'gift or waste,' the averments
that the options were granted for 'no consideration,' is tanta-
mount to an allegation of gift or waste of assets. The essence of
a claim of gift is lack of consideration.'" 5
Defendants in Michelson invoked the Delaware statute that
provides: "In the absence of actual fraud in the transaction, the
judgment of the directors as to the consideration for the issu-
ance of such rights or options and the sufficiency thereof shall be
conclusive."" Said the court: "We do not read § 157 as intended
to erect a legal barrier to any claim for relief as to an alleged gift
or waste of corporate assets in the issuance of stock options
where the claim asserted is one of absolute failure of considera-
tion."97 Defendants also sought to rest on the fact that the op-
tions had been granted by disinterested directors and ratified by
the stockholders of the company.'8 Said the court: "[NJon-unan-
imous shareholder approval cannot cure an act of waste of cor-
porate assets."" This would be a fortiori as to disinterested di-
rectors and compensation committees. And finally: "Although
directors are given wide latitude in making business judgments,
they are bound to act out of fidelity and honesty in their roles as
fiduciaries .... And they may not, simply because of their po-
sition, 'by way of excessive salaries and other devices, oust the
minority of a fair return upon its investment' . . . . It is com-
mon sense that a transfer for no consideration amounts to a gift
93. 407 A.2d 211 (Del. 1979).
94. Id. at 217.
95. Id. (emphasis added).
96. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8 § 157 (1978). See Michelson v. Duncan, 407 A.2d at 223.
97. 407 A.2d at 224.
98. Id.
99. Id. (citation omitted).
19821
23
PACE LAW REVIEW [Vol. 3:15
or waste of corporate assets. '""
Corporate counsel are prone to seize on the business judg-
ment rule as if recitation of the phrase ought to be conclusive of
an issue. The fact is that STAs do not present the courts with
complex corporate decision-making of the kind that merits total
deference to a board's business judgment.101 Neither good faith
nor even an honest, if misguided, desire to benefit the corpora-
tion, to which a court might defer in other circumstances, erect
barriers to an inquiry into the validity of a purported con-
tract.102 Zapata Corp. v. Maldonado10 3 adds a further dimension
to the inquiry. The facts of corporate life-the undeniable colle-
gial ambience of the boardroom, the constant contact, social and
otherwise, of independent board and compensation committee
members with employee members of the board and other top
executives 04 -influenced the Delaware Supreme Court in that
case to require a measure of judicial review of independent
members' decision to seek dismissal of a derivative suit. 05 The
recipients of STAs, for the most part top executives, are the very
100. Id. at 217 (citations omitted).
101. Federal courts frequently review the reasonableness of executive compensation
under Internal Revenue Code provisions limiting deductions for salaries and other com-
pensation to reasonable allowances. See, e.g., Hatt v. Commissioner, 28 T.C.M. (CCH)
1194 (1969), afl'd per curiam, 457 F.2d 499 (7th Cir. 1972). For a Delaware case that,
while acknowledging the authority of a board of directors to determine officers' compen-
sation, nevertheless reviewed the reasonableness of an officers' compensation, see Wild-
erman v. Wilderman, 315 A.2d 610, 615-16 (Del. Ch. 1974).
102. Cf. Mobil Corp. v. Marathon Oil Co., Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 98,399, at 92,406
(6th Cir. Dec. 23 1981), where a finding of good faith and loyalty on the part of the
directors of a target company in granting so-called "lockup options" to a white knight
did not keep the Sixth Circuit from holding the grant in violation of the securities laws.
103. 430 A.2d 779 (Del. 1981).
104. For a critique of the independent director's efficacy as a monitor of managerial
integrity, including management's desire for added rewards, see Brudney, The Indepen-
dent Director-Heavenly City or Potemkin Village? 95 HARv. L. REV. 597, 610-22 (1982).
Cf. Loomis, The Madness of Executive Compensation, FORTUNE 42, 45 (July 12, 1982):
It is widely believed that many compensation committees are rubber stamps, un-
willing to be hard-nosed about the pay of top executives, particularly those chaps
who are fellow members of the board. Any reader of this article can imagine what
his own attitude would be if he were required to sit in semi-public judgment on
the salaries of his peers, some of whom were good friends. He would likely avoid
harsh judgments and, in the end, be generous to a fault, particularly if he had the
privilege of using money not his own.
Id.
105. Zapata Corp. v. Maldonado, 430 A.2d at 781.
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persons with whom "outside" board and committee members
deal regularly in the latter's performance of their functions. It is
not strange in the circumstances that they may be "sympa-
thetic," but this is not an excuse for indulgence in corporate
waste.106
V. Conclusion
By unbundling one element of alleged compensation, and
permitting its analysis unencumbered by other factors the emer-
gence of the STA, with its grasping for "greater security," may
have performed a public service. 107 The current excesses in cor-
porate compensation 0 8 are underlined by the total lack of merit
of this latest example which, stripped of its advocates' rational-
izations and draftsmen's window-dressing, can be seen for what
it is-a parting gift of corporate moneys without support in con-
tract or corporate law. Mindful of the substantial, and at times
extravagent, amounts already routinely received by executives
on their normal departure from the corporation, from pension,
incentive, and stock option plans, performance shares, and like
programs, one is compelled, to ask, recalling a comparable ques-
tion:10 9 How much security does a man need?
106. "At some point even the 'disinterested' grant of excessive compensation be-
comes a problem of gross imprudence or waste of assets, whether or not self-dealing is
involved." JENNINGS & BUXBAUM, CORPORATIONS 466 (5th ed. 1979).
107. There are intimations that STA provisions may be merged into "ordinary" em-
ployment contracts in the future. See Herzel, supra note 71, at 23. It would only sharpen
the contrast between "normal" and STA benefits on termination to include them in the
same agreement. STA benefits, being hinged on a change in control, should remain easily
severable as serving no valid corporate purpose.
108. See Loomis, supra note 105; Kraus, Executive Pay: Ripe for Reform?, HAsv.
Bus. REV., Sept.-Oct. 1980, at 36; Crystal, When Management Takes Care of Itself, N.Y.
Times, June 13, 1982, at F2, col. 3.
109. "How Much Land Does A Man Need?" Tolstoy's profound parable with that
title can be found in A TREASURY OF RUSSIAN Lrr&ATuRE (B.G. Guerney ed. 1943). The
answer, for those who may not know it, is-six feet.
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